We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an ε-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every ε > 0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of ε-equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space. Neveu (1975) then proved that this problem has a value, provided
1. Introduction. The following optimization problem was presented by Dynkin (1969) . Two players observe a realization of two real-valued processes (x n ) and (R n ). Player 1 can stop whenever x n ≥ 0, and player 2 can stop whenever x n < 0. At the first stage θ in which one of the players stops, player 2 pays player 1 the amount R θ and the process terminates. If no player ever stops, player 2 does not pay anything.
A strategy of player 1 is a stopping time µ that satisfies {µ = n} ⊆ {x n ≥ 0} for every n ≥ 0. A strategy ν of player 2 is defined analogously. The termination stage is simply θ = min{µ, ν}. For a given pair (µ, ν) of strategies, denote by γ (µ, ν) = E 1 {θ<∞} R θ the expected payoff to player 1. Dynkin (1969) proved that if sup n≥0 |R n | ∈ L 1 , this problem has a value v; that is, v = sup µ inf ν γ (µ, ν) = inf ν sup µ γ (µ, ν) .
He moreover characterized ε-optimal strategies; that is, strategies µ (resp. ν) that achieve the supremum (resp. the infimum) up to ε. Neveu (1975) generalized this problem by allowing both players to stop at every stage, and by introducing three real-valued processes (R {1},n ), (R {2},n ) and (R {1,2},n ). The expected payoff to player 1 is defined by (a) sup n≥0 max{|R {1},n |, |R {2},n |, |R {1,2},n |} ∈ L 1 and (b) R {1},n = R {1,2},n ≤ R {2},n .
Recently Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2001) studied games in Neveu's setup, but allowed the players to use randomized stopping times: a strategy is a [0, 1]-valued process that dictates the probability by which the player stops at every stage. They proved that the problem has a value, assuming only condition (a).
Extensive literature provides sufficient conditions for the existence of the value in continuous time [see, e.g., Bismut (1977) , Alario-Nazaret, Lepeltier and Marchal (1982) , Lepeltier and Maingueneau (1984) , Touzi and Vieille (2002) and Laraki and Solan (2002) ]. Some authors have studied the diffusion case, see, for example, Cvitanić and Karatzas (1996) .
The nonzero-sum problem in discrete time when the payoffs have a special structure was studied, among others, by Mamer (1987) , Morimoto (1986) , Ohtsubo (1987 Ohtsubo ( , 1991 , Nowak and Szajowski (1999) and Neumann, Ramsey and Szajowski (2002) and the references therein. In the nonzero-sum case, the processes (R {1},n ), (R {2},n ) and (R {1,2},n ) are R 2 -valued, and the expected payoff to player i, i = 1, 2, is
The goal of each player is to maximize his or her own expected payoff. Given ε > 0, a pair of stopping times (µ, ν) is an ε-equilibrium if for every pair of stopping times (µ , ν ), γ 1 (µ, ν) ≥ γ 1 (µ , ν) − ε and γ 2 (µ, ν) ≥ γ 2 (µ, ν ) − ε.
The above-mentioned authors provided various sufficient conditions under which ε-equilibria exist.
In the present paper, we study two-player nonzero-sum games in discrete time with randomized stopping times, and we prove the existence of an ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0, under merely an integrability condition. Our technique is based on a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem. Ramsey (1930) proved that for every coloring of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is a complete infinite monochromatic subgraph. Our variation allows us to reduce the problem of the existence of an ε-equilibrium in a general stopping game to that of studying properties of ε-equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space.
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we provide the model and the main result. A sketch of the proof appears in Section 3. In Section 4 we present a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem. In Section 5 we define the notion of games played on a finite tree and we study some of their properties. The proof of the main result in this section is relegated to Section 8. In Section 6 we show how to approximate a general filtration between two stopping times by a sequence of finite algebras. In Section 7 we construct an ε-equilibria. We end by discussing extensions to more than two players in Section 9.
Our proof uses tools both from the theory of stochastic processes (Sections 4 and 6) and from the theory of games (Sections 5 and 8). However, no prior knowledge of these fields is assumed.
The model and the main result.
A two-player nonzero-sum stopping game is a 5-tuple = ( , A, p, F , R) where:
• ( , A, p) is a probability space; • F = (F n ) n≥0 is a filtration over ( , A, p); • R = (R n ) n≥0 is an F -adapted R 6 -valued process. The coordinates of R n are denoted by R i Q,n , i = 1, 2, φ = Q ⊆ {1, 2}. A (behavior) strategy for player 1 (resp. player 2) is a [0, 1]-valued F -adapted process x = (x n ) n≥0 [resp. y = (y n ) n≥0 ]. The interpretation is that x n (resp. y n ) is the probability by which player 1 (resp. player 2) stops at stage n (provided the game is not stopped before that stage).
Let θ be the first stage, possibly infinite, in which at least one of the players stops and let φ = Q ⊆ {1, 2} be the set of players that stop at stage θ (provided θ < ∞). The expected payoff under (x, y) is given by
where the expectation E x,y is with respect to (w.r.t.) the distribution P x,y over plays induced by (x, y) , and 1 is the indicator function. DEFINITION 2.1. Let = ( , A, p, F , R) be a two-player nonzero-sum stopping game and let ε > 0. A pair of strategies (x * , y * ) is an ε-equilibrium if γ 1 (x * , y * ) ≥ γ 1 (x, y * ) − ε and γ 2 (x * , y * ) ≥ γ 2 (x * , y) − ε for every x and y.
The main result of the paper is the following: THEOREM 2.2. Let = ( , A, p, F , R) be a two-player nonzero-sum stopping game such that sup n≥0 R n ∞ ∈ L 1 (p). Then for every ε > 0, the game admits an ε-equilibrium.
The definitions imply that for every two payoff processes R and R such that E[sup n∈N R n − R n ∞ ] < ε, every ε-equilibrium in ( , A, p, F , R) is a 3ε-equilibrium in ( , A, p, F , R). Hence we can assume without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) that the payoff process R is uniformly bounded and that its range is finite. Actually, we assume that for some K ∈ N, R n ∈ {0, ± 1 K , ± 2 K , . . . , ± K K } 6 for every n ∈ N.
Third, we have to generalize Ramsey's theorem to this stochastic setup. This is done in Section 4.
A stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem.
In the present section we provide a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem. Let ( , A, p) be a probability space and let F = (F n ) n≥0 be a filtration. For every set A ⊆ ,
Ramsey (1930) proved that for every function that attaches a color c(k, l) ∈ C, where C is a finite set, to every two nonnegative integers k < l, there is an increasing sequence of integers k 0 < k 1 < · · · such that c(k 0 , k 1 ) = c(k i , k j ) for every i < j.
We are going to attach for every nonnegative integer n and every stopping time τ , an F n -measurable function c n,τ that is defined over the set {τ > n}, whose range is some finite set C. We also impose a consistency requirement: if τ 1 = τ 2 > n on an F n -measurable set F , then c n,τ 1 = c n,τ 2 on F . Under these conditions, we derive a weaker conclusion than that of Ramsey's theorem: for every ε > 0 there exists an increasing sequence of stopping times
We now formally present the result.
DEFINITION 4.1. An NT function is a function that assigns to every integer n ≥ 0 and every bounded stopping time τ an F n -measurable random variable (r.v.) that is defined over the set {τ > n}. We say that an NT function f is C-valued for some set C if the r.v. f n,τ is C-valued for every n ≥ 0 and every τ . DEFINITION 4.2. An NT function f is F -consistent if for every n ≥ 0, every F n -measurable set F and every two bounded stopping times τ 1 , τ 2 , we have
When f is an NT function and σ < τ are two bounded stopping times, we denote
The main result of this section is the following. THEOREM 4.3. For every finite set C of colors, every C-valued F -consistent NT function c and every ε > 0, there exists a sequence of bounded stopping times
COMMENT. The natural stochastic generalization of Ramsey's theorem requires the stronger condition p(c θ 0 ,θ 1 = c θ i ,θ j ∀ 0 ≤ i < j) ≥ 1 − ε. We do not know whether this generalization is correct.
The following example shows that a sequence of stopping times θ 0 < θ 1 < θ 2 < · · · such that p(c θ 0 ,θ 1 = c θ 1 ,θ 2 = · · ·) = 1 need not exist, even without the boundedness condition. EXAMPLE 4.4. Let X n be a biased random walk on the integers, let X 0 = 0 and let p(X n+1 = X n + 1) = 1 − p(X n+1 = X n − 1) = 3/4. Let F n = σ (X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n ). Let R 0 = and, for every n > 0, let R n = 1≤k≤n {X k = −1}. For every finite (but not necessarily bounded) stopping time τ define c n,τ = Red on R n ∩ {τ > n} and c n,τ = Blue on R c n ∩ {τ > n}. Since p( n≥0 R n ) < 1, whereas for every finite stopping time θ and every B ∈ F θ , one has p( n≥0 R n |B) > 0, it follows that for every sequence θ 0 < θ 1 < · · · of finite stopping times p(c θ 0 ,θ 1 = Blue) > 0, whereas p(c θ 0 ,θ 1 = c θ 1 ,θ 2 = · · · = Blue|c θ 0 ,θ 1 = Blue) < 1.
We start by proving a slightly stronger version of Theorem 4.3 for |C| = 2.
LEMMA 4.5. Let C = {Blue, Red} and let c be a C-valued F -consistent NT function. For every ε > 0 there exist N ∈ N, two setsR,B ∈ F N and a sequence N ≤ τ 0 < τ 1 < τ 2 < · · · of bounded stopping times, such that:
PROOF. We claim first that for every n ∈ N we can find two sets R n , B n ∈ F n and a bounded stopping time σ n such that: 1. We have p(R n ∪ B n ) > 1 − 1/2 n . 2. We have {σ n > n} on R n and c n,σ n = Red on R n . 3. For every bounded stopping time τ , c n,τ = Blue on B n ∩ {τ > n}.
To see this, fix n ∈ N. Call a set F ∈ F n red if there exists a bounded stopping time σ F such that on F both σ F > n and c n,
Observe that F * ∈ F n and p(F * ) = α. Moreover, no subset of F c * with positive probability is red. Let R n = F 2 n , let σ n be a bounded stopping time such that on R n , σ n > n and c n,σ n = Red, and let B n = F c * . This concludes the proof of the claim.
Let
On R, and therefore also on R ∩R, both B n and (B n ∪ R n ) c occur only finitely many times. By sufficiently increasing N , we assume w.l.o.g. that p( n≥N R n |R ∩R) > 1 − ε. In particular,
Let N = n 0 < n 1 < n 2 < · · · be a sequence of integers such that, for every k ≥ 0, p(T k |B ∩B) > 1 − ε/2 k+1 , where T k = n k ≤n<n i+k B n . Then p( k≥0 T k |B ∩ B) > 1 − ε and, therefore,
We now define the sequence (τ k ) k≥0 inductively, working separately on R andB. Consider first the setR. Define τ 0 = N . Given τ k , define τ k+1 = n∈N σ n 1 {τ k =n}∩R n ∩R onR ∩ n ({τ k = n} ∩ R n ). Since τ k and (σ n ) n≥0 are bounded, τ k+1 can be extended to a bounded stopping time onR. By definition c τ 0 ,τ 1 = c τ 1 ,τ 2 = · · · = Red onR ∩ ( n≥N R n ), and it follows from (2) that p(c τ 0 ,τ 1 = c τ 1 ,τ 2 = · · · = Red|R) ≥ 1 − 2ε.
Consider now the setB. Define τ 0 = N . Define τ k+1 (w) = min{n k ≤ n < n k+1 , w ∈ B n } onB ∩ T k and τ k+1 = n k+1 − 1 onB \ T k . By the definition of τ k , for every k, l ∈ N, c τ k ,τ l = Blue onB ∩ ( k≥0 T k ) and it follows from (3) that p(c τ k ,τ l = Blue ∀ k, l|B) > 1 − 2ε.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3. We prove the theorem by induction on |C|. The case |C| = 2 follows from Lemma 4.5. Assume we have already proven the theorem for |C| = r and assume |C| = r + 1. Let Red be a color in C.
By considering all colors other than Red as a single fictitious color and by applying Lemma 4.5, there exist N ∈ N, two setsR,B ∈ F N and a sequence of stopping times N ≤ τ 0 < τ 1 < · · · such that (i)R =B c , (ii) p(c τ 0 ,τ 1 = c τ 1 ,τ 2 = · · · = Red|R) > 1 − ε/2 and (iii) p(c τ k ,τ l = Red ∀ k, l|B) > 1 − ε/2. We define θ i separately onR andB. OnR, we let θ i = τ i .
We now restrict ourselves to the space (B, AB, pB ) with the filtration G n = F τ n ∩B. Letc be the C-valued NT function over G defined byc n,β = c τ n ,τ β for every stopping time β of G, where τ β = n τ n 1 {β=n} is a stopping time of F . Let c be the coloring that is obtained from c by swapping the color Red with another color in C, say Green:
Green, ifc n,β = Red.
Since c is a C \ {Red}-valued G-consistent NT function, we can apply the induction hypothesis and obtain a sequence of stopping times 0
By (4) and (iii) it follows that p(c β 0 ,β 1 =c β 1 ,β 2 = · · · |B) > 1 − ε. We define
Combining (ii) and (5) we get p(c θ 0 ,θ 1 = c θ 1 ,θ 2 = · · ·) > 1 − ε, as desired.
Stopping games on finite trees.
An important building block in our analysis is stopping games that are played on a finite tree. In the present section we define these games and study some of their properties. 5.1. The model. DEFINITION 5.1. A stopping game on a finite tree (or simply a game on a tree) is a tuple T = (S, S 1 , r, (C s , p s , R s ) s∈S\S 1 ), where • (S, S 1 , r, (C s ) s∈S\S 1 ) is a tree, S is a nonempty finite set of nodes, S 1 ⊆ S is a nonempty set of leaves, r ∈ S is the root and, for each s ∈ S \ S 1 , C s ⊆ S \ {r} is the nonempty set of children of s [we denote by S 0 = S \ S 1 the set of nodes which are not leaves; for every s ∈ S, depth(s) is the depth of s-the length of the path that connects the root to s] and for every s ∈ S 0 ,
• p s is a probability distribution over C s ;
A stopping game on a finite tree starts at the root and is played in stages. Given the current node s ∈ S 0 , and the sequence of nodes already visited, both players decide, simultaneously and independently, whether to stop or to continue. Let Q be the set of players that decide to stop. If Q = φ, the play terminates and the terminal payoff to each player i is R i Q,s . If Q = φ, a new node s in C s is chosen according to p s . The process now repeats itself, with s being the current node. If s ∈ S 1 , the new current node is the root r. Thus, players cannot stop at leaves.
The game on the tree is essentially played in rounds. The round starts at the root and ends once it reaches a leaf.
Consider the first round of the game. Let t be the stopping stage. If no termination occurs in the first round, t = ∞. If t < ∞, let s be the node (of depth t) in which termination occurred and let Q be the set of players that stop at stage t. The r.v. r i = R i Q,s 1 {t<∞} is the payoff to player i in the first round. A stationary strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) is a function x : S 0 → [0, 1] (resp. y : S 0 → [0, 1]); x(s) is the probability that player 1 stops at s. Denote by P x,y the distribution over plays induced by (x, y), and denote by E x,y the corresponding expectation operator.
For every pair of stationary strategies (x, y) we denote by π(x, y) = P x,y (t < ∞) the probability that under (x, y) the game terminates in the first round of the game; that is, the probability that the root is visited only once along the play. We denote by ρ i (x, y) = E x,y [r i ], i = 1, 2, the expected payoff of player i in a single round. Finally, we set γ i (x, y) = ρ i (x, y)/π(x, y) (by convention, 0 0 = 0). This is the expected payoff under (x, y). In particular,
When we want to emphasize the dependency of these variables on the game T , we write π(x, y; T ), ρ i (x, y; T ) and γ i (x, y; T ) .
Observe that for every pair of stationary strategies (x, y),
where 0 is the strategy that never stops; that is, 0(s) = 0 for every s.
COMMENT. A stopping game on a finite tree T is equivalent to a recursive absorbing game, where each round of the game T corresponds to a single stage of the recursive absorbing game. A recursive absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single nonabsorbing state in which the payoff in nonabsorbing states is 0. Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze (1996) proved that every recursive absorbing game admits an ε-equilibrium in stationary strategies. This result also follows from the analysis of Vrieze and Thuijsman (1989) . However, there is no bound on the perround probability of termination under this ε-equilibrium and we need to bound this quantity.
5.2.
Main results concerning games on trees. Throughout this section we fix R 1 , R 2 ∈ R, such that at least one of them is positive, and play a game on a tree whose payoffs (R s ) s∈S 0 satisfy the following conditions for every i = 1, 2, every ∅ ⊂ Q ⊆ {1, 2} and every node s ∈ S 0 :
We have already seen that condition B1 can be assumed w.l.o.g. We will later set R i to be an upper bound of (R i {i},n ), so that condition B2 can be assumed. The results we prove in this section are not trivial only when R 1 {1},s = R 1 and R 2 {2},s = R 2 for some s, s ∈ S 0 . As we see later, when condition B3 or B4 does not hold, a simple ε-equilibrium exists.
Assuming no player ever stops, the collection (p s ) s∈S 0 of probability distributions at the nodes induces a probability distribution over the set S 1 of leaves or, equivalently, over the set of branches that connect the root to the leaves. For each set D ⊆ S 0 , we denote by p D the probability that the chosen branch passes through D. For each s ∈ S, we denote by F s the event that the chosen branch passes through s.
We first bound the probability of termination in a single round when the ε-equilibrium payoff is low for at least one player.
is the probability that if both players never stop, the game visits a node s with R 1 {1},s = R 1 in the first round.
An analogous statement holds for player 2.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.3. Consider the following strategy z of player 1:
Denote by t 1 and t 2 the stopping stages of the two players in the first round. By the definition of z, and since payoffs are bounded by 1,
Since (x, y) is an ε 2 -equilibrium and since, by (7), π(z, y) ≤ π(0, y) + π(z, 0) = π(0, y) + µ 1 ,
Equations (8) and (9) imply that π(0, y) ≥ ε 6 × µ 1 .
In words, T is a subgame of T if we remove all the descendants (in the strict sense) of several nodes from the tree (S, S 1 , r, (C s ) s∈S 0 ) and keep all other parameters fixed. Observe that this notion is different from the standard definition of a subgame in game theory.
Let T = (S, S 1 , r, (C s , p s , R s ) s∈S 0 ) be a game on a tree. For each subset D ⊆ S 0 , we denote by T D the subgame of T generated by trimming T from D downward. Thus, all strict descendants of nodes in D are removed.
For every subgame T of T and every subgame T of T , let p T ,T = p S 1 \S 1 be the probability that the chosen branch in T passes through a leaf of T strictly before it passes through a leaf of T (here, S 1 and S 1 are the sets of leaves of T and T , resp.).
The next proposition analyzes ε-equilibria that yield a high payoff to both players. Since its proof is involved and independent of the rest of the paper, it is deferred to Section 8.
There exist a set D ⊆ S 0 of nodes and a strategy pair (x, y) in T such that:
COMMENT. Actually we prove that in case 2(b), for every pair (x , y ) of strategies, γ 1 (x , y) ≤ a 1 + 8ε and γ 2 (x, y ) ≤ a 2 + 8ε.
Coloring a finite tree.
In the present section we provide an algorithm that for every finite tree T attaches a color c(T ) and several numbers (λ j (T )) j in the unit interval.
A
, all of which are either good or bad. Thus, for every u ∈ [−1, 1] 2 there is a rectangle m ∈ M such that u ∈ m. We denote by H = {h 1 , h 2 , . . . , h J } the set of bad rectangles in M and denote by G = {g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g V } the set of good rectangles in M.
Set C = G ∪ {∅}. This set is composed of the set G of good rectangles together with another symbol ∅. For every game on a tree T consider the following procedure which attaches an element c ∈ C to T :
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ J apply Proposition 5.5 to T (j −1) and the bad rectangle h j = [a j,1 , a j,1 + ε] × [a j,2 , a j,2 + ε] to obtain a subgame T (j ) of T (j −1) and
is the probability that a randomly chosen branch passes through a leaf of T (j ) which is not a leaf of T (j −1) (see Section 5.1).
• If T (J ) is trivial (i.e., the only node is the root), set c(T ) = ∅; otherwise choose a stationary ε 2 -equilibrium (x (0) , y (0) ) of T (J ) . Since T (J ) is a subgame of each T (j ) , j = 1, . . . , J , since no subgame of T (j ) has an ε-equilibrium with corresponding payoffs in h j and since every ε 2 -equilibrium is also an ε-equilibrium, the corresponding ε 2 -equilibrium payoff lies in some good rectangle g ∈ G. Set c(T ) = g.
The strategies (x (j ) T , y (j ) T ), as given by Proposition 5.5, are strategies in T (j −1) . We consider them as strategies in T by letting them continue from the leaves of T (j −1) downward.
We also define, for every j ∈ J ,
6. Representative approximations. Theorem 4.3 enables us to reduce the analysis to finite-stage games: games that start at some stage n and terminate at stage τ , where τ is some bounded stopping time. Since the state space is arbitrary, while our game-theoretic tools allow us to analyze only games that are defined over a finite state space, we need to approximate each F n by a finite σ -algebra.
Roughly, our goal here is to define a consistent NT function T = (T n,τ ) that assigns for every n ≥ 0, every bounded stopping time τ and every ω ∈ , a game on a tree T n,τ (ω) that approximates the finite-stage game that is played between stages n and τ in a desirable way. This is done in two stages. First, we define, for every k ≥ n, a finite partition G k of such that (G k ) k≥n contains all the information relevant to the players between stages n and τ . Second, given the sequence of finite partitions, we define the games on a tree (T n,τ (ω)) ω∈ .
Throughout this section we fix a stopping game and ε > 0. Denote δ n = ε 2 /2 n+2 for each n ≥ 0. Set n = k≥n δ k = ε 2 /2 n+1 , so that n≥0 n = ε 2 . 6.1. Partial games. In the present section we consider the partial game that is played between stages τ 1 and τ 2 , where τ 1 ≤ τ 2 are two bounded stopping times, and we define and study the notion of approximating games on a tree. DEFINITION 6.1. Let τ 1 ≤ τ 2 be two bounded stopping times. An (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )strategy is a sequence x = (x k ) of random variables such that for every k ≥ 0,
Thus, an (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategy prescribes to the player what to play between stages τ 1 and τ 2 (excluded). If 0 = τ 0 < τ 1 < · · · is an increasing sequence of bounded stopping times and if, for each l ≥ 0, x l is an (F , τ l , τ l+1 )-strategy, we can naturally define a strategy x in the stopping game simply by concatenating the strategies (x l ) l≥0 . Similarly, any strategy x = (x k ) k≥0 in the stopping game naturally defines an (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategy for every pair of bounded stopping times τ 1 ≤ τ 2 by considering the proper restriction of x.
When x and y are two (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategies, we define by π(x, y; F , τ 1 , τ 2 ) = P x,y [1 {τ 1 ≤θ<τ 2 } |F τ 1 ] the conditional probability under (x, y) that the game that starts at stage τ 1 ends before stage τ 2 , and define by
These are F τ 1 -measurable r.v.'s. DEFINITION 6.2. Let τ 1 ≤ τ 2 be two bounded stopping times. A δ approximation of between τ 1 and τ 2 is a pair ((G k ), (q G,k )) such that for every k ≥ 0:
are unions of atoms in G k ; 4. any atom G of G k such that k < τ 2 on G is a union of some atoms in G k+1 ; 5. for every atom G of G k , q G,k is a probability distribution over the atoms of G k+1 that are contained in G;
We identify G k with the finite σ -algebra generated by G k and we denote G = (G k ) k≥0 .
With every δ approximation (G, (q G,k )) of between τ 1 and τ 2 and every atom G of G τ 1 we can attach a game on a tree.
• The root is G.
• The nodes are all nonempty atoms F of (G k 
• The payoff is given by (R k ) τ 1 ≤k≤τ 2 .
• The children of each atom F in G k are all atoms F in G k+1 which are subsets of F . • The transition from any node F in G k is given by q F,k .
We denote this game on a tree by T (τ 1 , τ 2 ; G, (q G,k ), G).
Suppose that for every atom G of G τ 1 , x G is a strategy in the game T (τ 1 , τ 2 ; G, (q G,k ), G). The collection of those strategies naturally defines a (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategy.
Similarly, if x = (x k ) is an (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategy such that for every k, x k is G k -measurable, then x naturally defines a strategy in T (τ 1 , τ 2 ; G, (q G,k ) , G) for every atom G of G τ 1 .
Let (x, y) be a pair of (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategies such that for every k, x k and y k are G k -measurable. We denote by π(x, y; τ 1 , τ 2 , G, (q G,k )) the probability of termination in one round of the game on a tree T (τ 1 , τ 2 ; G, (q G,k ), G) under the strategies (x, y), by ρ(x, y; τ 1 , τ 2 , G, (q G,k )) the expected payoff in one round, and by
the expected payoff in the game. These three functions are G τ 1 -measurable.
The following lemma provides estimates for the difference between the expected payoff and the expected probability of termination, when the filtration is changed. Its proof is omitted. LEMMA 6.3. Let τ 1 ≤ τ 2 be two bounded stopping times and let (G, (q G,k )) be a δ approximation of between τ 1 and τ 2 . Let x and y be a pair of (G, τ 1 , τ 2 )strategies. Then:
The following lemma states that if (G, (q G,k ) ) is a δ approximation of between τ 1 and τ 2 , and if the opponent plays a (G, τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategy, then the player does not lose much by considering only (G, τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategies [rather than (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategies].
LEMMA 6.4. Let τ 1 ≤ τ 2 be two bounded stopping times and let (G, (q G,k ) ) be a δ approximation of between τ 1 and τ 2 . Let x be a (G, τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategy for player 1 and set γ = ess sup{γ 2 (x, y; G, τ 1 , τ 2 ), y is a (G, τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategy}. Then, for every (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategy y,
When player 2 is restricted to use (H, τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategies, α(H) is his or her best possible payoff in the game that starts at stage τ 1 and, if no player stops before stage τ 2 , terminates with payoff γ . From the definition of γ it follows that α(G) ≤ γ . Define recursively
The first term of the maximization in the second line corresponds to player 2 not stopping at stage k, while the second term corresponds to player 2 stopping at that stage. Plainly α(H) = α(τ 1 , H). Since x k and R 2 k are G k -measurable and since (G, (q G,k ) ) is a δ approximation of between τ 1 and τ 2 , it follows by induction that α
6.2. Approximating the filtration F . Our main result in this section is the following: THEOREM 6.5. Let be a two-player nonzero-sum stopping game. There is a consistent NT function that assigns to every n ≥ 0 and every bounded stopping time τ a δ approximation of between n and τ .
The proof of this result, though quite technical, is intuitive. We start at stage τ and we proceed backward until we reach stage n. For every stage n ≤ k ≤ τ , we define a finite partition of . Roughly, the partition G k at stage k is defined in such a way that (i) payoffs at stage k are measurable w.r.t. G k and (ii) the conditional probability to reach any atom G ∈ G k+1 does not vary by much over each atom of G k . The construction is slightly complicated since it should be consistent. PROOF OF THEOREM 6.5. For every i ≥ 0 and every n ∈ N, choose once and for all a partition B n i of the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex {r ∈ R n : n j =1 r j = 1, r j ≥ 0 ∀ j } such that the diameter of each element in B n i is less than δ i in the norm · 1 . For each B ∈ B n i choose an element q B ∈ B. Fix a total order on the collection of subsets of . This enables us to identify, for every partition G of to n atoms, the space R n with the space R G , simply by identifying the ith coordinate of R n with the ith atom of G according to the total order. Fix a nonnegative integer n ≥ 0 and a bounded stopping time τ . Let M be a bound on τ . We first define a sequence of finite partitions (G k ) recursively from M down to n. We say that ω ≈ M ω if and only if (i) τ (ω) = τ (ω ) = M and (ii) R M (ω) = R M (ω ). We letG M be the partition of induced by the ≈ M relation. ThenG M ⊆ F M .
Suppose we have already defined a finite partitionG m+1 ⊆ F m+1 . We say that ω ≈ m ω if and only if one of the following two compound conditions is satisfied: (ω ) and (iii) the two probability distributions (P(G|F m )(ω)) G∈G m+1 and (P(G|F m )(ω )) G∈G m+1 have the same support, and their restrictions to their support lie in the same element of B c m , where c = |{G ∈ G m+1 : P(G|F m )(ω) > 0}| is the number of atoms ofG m+1 in the common support.
We letG m be the partition of derived by the ≈ m relation.
Define for every m and every atom G ofG m a probability distributionq G,m over the atoms ofG m+1 that are contained in G simply byq G,m = q * B , where B is the atom of B c m that contains all probability distributions (P(G|F m )(ω)) G∈G m+1 for ω ∈ G, and c is defined as above.
The sequence (G m ) satisfies the following properties:
The pair ((G m ), (q G,m )) is not a δ approximation of between n and τ , since (G m ) is not increasing (see condition 4 in Definition 6.2). We remedy this flaw by taking upward intersections. For every m ≥ n let G m = n≤k≤mGk be the finite σ -algebra spanned byG n , . . . ,G m . Let G be an atom of G m . Then G ⊆G for some atomG ofG m . We define a probability distribution q G,m over the atoms of G m+1 by
It can be verified that ((G m ), (q G,m )) is a δ approximation of between n and τ , and that each step in the construction is consistent.
Theorem 6.5, together with the discussion in Section 6.1 that relates δ approximation to games on trees and Lemmas 6.3 and 6.4, yields the following corollary: COROLLARY 6.6. Let be a two-player nonzero-sum stopping game. There is a consistent NT function T = (T n,τ ) that assigns for every n ≥ 0, every bounded stopping time τ and every ω ∈ , a game on a tree T n,τ (ω) such that the following hold for every n and every τ :
1. For every pair of strategies (x, y) in T n,τ and each i = 1, 2, |ρ i (x, y; F , n, τ )− ρ i (x, y; T n,τ )| < n . 2. For every pair of strategies (x, y) in T n,τ , |π(x, y; F , n, τ ) − π(x, y; T n,τ )| < n . 3. If (x, y) is an ε-equilibrium in T n,τ (ω) with expected payoff in [a 1 , a 1 + ε] × [a 2 , a 2 + ε], then: (i) For every strategy y of player 2, ρ 2 (x, y ; F , n, τ ) ≤ (a 2 + 2ε)π(x, y ; F , n, τ ) + n . (ii) For every strategy x of player 1, ρ 1 (x , y; F , n, τ ) ≤ (a 1 + 2ε)π(x , y;
F , n, τ ) + n .
[In the preceding list of inequalities, we identify strategies in T n,τ with the corresponding (F , n, τ )-strategies in .]
Constructing an ε-equilibrium.
In the present section we use all the tools we have developed so far to construct an ε-equilibrium. 7.1. A sufficient condition for existence of an equilibrium. Here we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium for games that satisfy the following conditions: A1. There exists K ∈ N such that for every n ≥ 0, R n ∈ {0, ± 1 K , ± 2 K , . . . , ± K K } 6 . A2. For every n ≥ 0, R 1 := lim sup n→∞ R 1 {1},n is constant and R 1 {1},n ≤ R 1 . A3. For every n ≥ 0, R 2 := lim sup n→∞ R 2 {2},n is constant and R 2 {2},n ≤ R 2 . A4. Whenever R 1 {1},n = R 1 , R 2 {1},n < R 2 . A5. Whenever R 2 {2},n = R 2 , R 1 {2},n < R 1 .
LEMMA 7.1. Let ε > 0 be given. Let be a stopping game that satisfies conditions A1-A5. Suppose that there is a payoff vector (a 1 , a 2 ), an increasing sequence of stopping times 0 = τ 0 < τ 1 < · · · and, for every k ≥ 0, a pair of (F , τ 1 , τ 2 )-strategies (x k , y k ) such that the following hold for every k ≥ 0:
For every (F , τ k , τ k+1 )-strategy y k , ρ 2 (x k , y k ; F , τ k , τ k+1 ) ≤ (a 2 + ε)π(x k , y k ; F , τ k , τ k+1 ) + τ k . D4. Almost surely, k≥0 π(x k , y k ; F , τ k , τ k+1 ) = ∞. D5. If a 1 < R 1 − ε, then k≥0 π(0, y k ; F , τ k , τ k+1 ) = ∞ a.s. D6. If a 2 < R 2 − ε, then k≥0 π(x k , 0; F , τ k , τ k+1 ) = ∞ a.s.
Then the game admits an 8ε-equilibrium.
In words, conditions D1-D3 roughly say that each (x k , y k ) is an ε-equilibrium with payoffs close to (a 1 , a 2 ). Condition D4 says that the concatenation of all the (x k , y k )'s stops with probability 1, while conditions D5 and D6 say that if one player receives a low payoff, then his or her opponent stops with probability 1 under the concatenation. The proof of Lemma 7.1 is standard. PROOF OF LEMMA 7.1. Denote by x (resp. y) the strategy in that is the concatenation of the strategies (x k ) k≥0 [resp. (y k ) k≥0 ].
By D4, P x,y (θ < ∞) = 1. By D5, if a 1 < R 1 −ε, then P 0,y (θ < ∞) = 1. By D6, if a 2 < R 2 − ε, then P x,0 (θ < ∞) = 1. Therefore, there is L ∈ N such that
We now define a pair of strategies (x * , y * ), which is a slight augmentation of (x, y): If a 1 < R 1 − ε, let y * coincide with y. If a 1 ≥ R 1 − ε, let y * be the strategy that coincides with y up to stage τ L , and from that stage onward, stops with probability ε whenever R 2 {2},n = R 2 (and with probability 0 otherwise). The strategy x * is defined analogously.
We argue that (x * , y * ) is an 8ε-equilibrium. We only prove that player 1 cannot profit more than 8ε by deviating.
By summing D1 for i = 1 over k ≥ 0, and since P x,y (θ < ∞) = 1 and ∞ k=1 τ k < ε, we obtain γ 1 (x, y) ≥ a 1 − 2ε. (13) Since (x * , y * ) coincides with (x, y) up to stage τ L and by (11),
Let x be any strategy of player 1 and, for every k ≥ 0, let x k be the (F , τ k , τ k+1 )-strategy induced by x .
By summing D2 over k ≥ 0 and since ∞ k=1 τ k < ε, we obtain
If a 1 < R 1 − ε, then by D5, P x ,y (θ < +∞) ≥ P 0,y (θ < +∞) = 1. Therefore, γ 1 (x , y) ≤ a 1 + 2ε.
Since y * coincides with y up to stage τ L and by (12),
We now consider the case a 1 ≥ R 1 − ε. By summing D2 over k = 0, . . . , L − 1 and since ∞ k=1 τ k < ε, we obtain
By the definition of y * after stage τ L , it follows that
By (15) and since R 1 ≤ a 1 + ε,
as desired.
As the following example shows, adding a threat of punishment might be necessary. EXAMPLE 7.2. Consider a game with deterministic payoffs: R {1},n = (−1, 2), R {2},n = (−2, 1) and R {1,2},n = (0, −3). We first argue that all ε-equilibrium payoffs are close to (−1, 2) .
Given a strategy x of player 1, player 2 can always wait until the probability of stopping under x is exhausted and then stop. Therefore, in any ε-equilibrium, the probability of stopping is at least 1 − ε, and the corresponding payoff is close to the convex hull of (−1, 2) and (−2, 1). Since player 1 can always guarantee −1 by stopping at the first stage, the claim follows.
However, in every ε-equilibrium (x, y), we must have P 0,y (θ < ∞) ≥ 1/2, otherwise player 1 receives more than −1 by never stopping.
Thus, an ε-equilibrium has the following structure, for some integer N . Player 1 stops with probability at least 1 − ε before stage N and with probability at most ε after that stage; player 2 stops with probability at most ε before stage N and with probability at least 1/2 after that stage. The strategy of player 2 serves as a threat of punishment: if player 1 does not stop before stage N he or she will be punished in subsequent stages.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Define
{1},n and R 2 = lim sup n→∞ R 2 {2},n . These are the maximal payoffs each player can guarantee by stopping when the opponent always continues. Recall that we assumed that the range R of the payoff process is finite, so that p-a.s. there exist infinitely many n's such that R 1 {1},n = R 1 and infinitely many n's such that R 2 {2},n = R 2 . We fix throughout ε > 0 sufficiently small. By Corollary 6.6 there is a consistent NT function (T n,τ ) that assigns for every n ≥ 0, every bounded stopping time τ , and every ω ∈ , a game on a tree that satisfies several desirable properties.
Define several subsets of as
and, for every r ∈ R,
Recall that for every two payoff processes R and R such that
We are now going to further partition the sets (A r,3 ) r∈R . In Section 5.3 we attached to each game on a graph T a color c(T ) (from a finite set of possible colors) and J numbers in the unit interval (λ j (T )) J j =1 . By Theorem 4.3 there is an increasing sequence of stopping times 0 ≤ τ 0 < τ 1 < · · · such that
Define the subsets of A r,3 , for every j = 1, . . . , J , A r,3;j = A r,3 ∩ k≥0 λ j T τ k ,τ k+1 = ∞ and, for each good rectangle g ∈ G, B r,3;g = A r,3 ∩ c T τ k ,τ k+1 = g ∀ k .
Let P * be the collection of sets A − , (A r,1 ), (A r,2 ) , (A r,3;j ) , (B r,3;g ) . By properly modifying the payoff process on a set with measure smaller than ε, and by possibly dropping the first few stopping times in the sequence (τ k ) and renaming the remaining stopping times, we can assume w.l.o.g. that (i) all the sets in P * are F τ 0 -measurable, (ii) R 1 {1},k ≤ R 1 and R 1 {2},k ≤ R 2 for every k ≥ τ 0 , and (iii) J j =1 k≥0 λ j (T τ k ,τ k+1 ) ≤ ε on g∈G B r,3;g . As the sets in P * are not necessarily disjoint, we let P be a finite partition of into F τ 0 -measurable sets such that for every atom B of P and every set B * in P * , either B ⊆ B * or B ∩ B * = ∅.
For every F τ 0 -measurable set B define the stopping game that is restricted to B and starts at stage τ 0 : B,τ 0 = (B, A B , p |B , (F τ 0 +k ) k≥0 , (R τ 0 +k ) k≥0 ), where A B is the σ -algebra over B induced by A and p |B is the probability distribution p conditioned on B.
The following lemma is standard.
LEMMA 7.3. If for every atom B of P with P(B) > 0, the game B,τ 0 admits an ε-equilibrium, then the game admits a 3ε-equilibrium.
PROOF. It is well known that any finite-stage game admits a 0-equilibrium [one can, e.g., adapt the proof for the zero-sum case given in Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2001) , Proposition 3.1]. Since τ 0 is bounded, and since we changed payoffs on a set of measure at most ε, the following strategy pair is a 3ε-equilibrium:
• If the game has not terminated by stage τ 0 , play from that stage on an ε-equilibrium in B,τ 0 , where B is the atom of P that contains ω. Denote by γ the F τ 0 -measurable payoff that corresponds to this strategy. • Until state τ 0 , play a 0-equilibrium in the game that terminates at stage τ 0 , if no player stops before that stage, with terminal payoff γ .
Thus, it remains to show that for every atom B of P , the game B,τ 0 admits a Cε-equilibrium for some C > 0. We verify this in the next sections. For convenience, we assume w.l.o.g. that τ 0 = 0. 7.2.1. B ⊆ A − . The game B,n admits a 0-equilibrium: The strategy pair where no player ever stops is a 0-equilibrium. Indeed, under this strategy the expected payoff for both players is 0, while any player i who stops at some stage k receives R i {i},k ≤ R i ≤ 0. 7.2.2. (i) B ⊆ A r,1 and r 1 ≥ 0 or (ii) B ⊆ A r,2 and r 2 ≥ 0. We deal only with case (i). The following strategy pair is a 2ε-equilibrium: Player 2 never stops, while player 1 stops with probability ε at every stage k such that R 1 {1},k = R 1 = r 1 and R 2 {1},k ≥ R 2 . The expected payoff to player 1 is r 1 , while the expected payoff to player 2 is at least r 2 . Since r 1 ≥ 0, player 1 cannot profit by deviating, while if player 2 stops at some stage k, his or her expected payoff is bounded by
7.2.3. (i) B ⊆ A r,1 and r 1 < 0 or (ii) B ⊆ A r,2 and r 2 < 0. We deal only with case (i). If r 2 ≤ 0, then B ⊆ A − , so that by Section 7.2.1 B,n admits a 0-equilibrium. Assume then that r 2 > 0. If lim sup n→∞,R 2 {2},n =R 2 R 1 {2},n ≥ R 1 , then B ⊆ A r,{2} , so that by Section 7.2.2 the game B,n admits a 2ε-equilibrium. Assume then that lim sup n→∞,R 2 {2},n =R 2 R 1 {2},n < R 1 . Under these assumptions, the following strategy pair is a 3ε-equilibrium: Player 1 stops at every stage k such that R 1 {1},k = r 1 and R 2 {1},k ≥ r 2 with probability ε, while player 2 stops at every stage k > N such that R 1 {2},k < r 1 with probability ε, where N is sufficiently large so that under this strategy, player 1 stops with probability at least 1 − ε prior to stage N .
In the last two cases we use the coloring procedure presented in Section 5.3 and the sufficient condition that appears in Lemma 7.1.
Denote by T (j ) (τ k , τ k+1 ) the tree that was generated in round j of the coloring procedure in Section 5.3 and denote by (x (j ) (τ k , τ k+1 ), y (j ) (τ k , τ k+1 ) ) the ε-equilibrium with payoff in a bad rectangle [a 1 , a 1 + ε] × [a 2 , a 2 + ε]. By the definition of λ j , π x (j ) (τ k , τ k+1 ), y (j ) 
We apply Lemma 7.1 with 2ε, {τ k } and {(x (j ) (τ k , τ k+1 ), y (j ) (τ k , τ k+1 ))}. Since the rectangle is bad, a 1 ≥ R 1 − ε and a 2 ≥ R 2 − ε, so that conditions D5 and D6 trivially hold.
Condition D4 holds by (16), (17) and Corollary 6.6.2. Condition D1 follows from the choice of (x (j ) (τ k , τ k+1 ), y (j ) (τ k , τ k+1 ) ) and by Corollary 6.6. Condition D2 follows from Corollary 6.6.3. The proof that condition D3 holds is analogous. The desired result follows by Lemma 7.1. 7.2.5. B ⊆ B r,3;g . Recall that on B r,3;g , c(T (τ k , τ k+1 )) = g for every k and J j =1 k≥0 λ j (T τ k ,τ k+1 ) ≤ ε. Since g = [a 1 , a 1 + ε] × [a 2 , a 2 + ε] is a good rectangle, a 1 ≤ R 1 −2ε or a 2 ≤ R 2 −2ε. We assume w.l.o.g. that a 1 ≤ R 1 −2ε. Let (x (0) (τ k , τ k+1 ), y (0) (τ k , τ k+1 )) be an ε 2 -equilibrium in T (J ) (τ k , τ k+1 ) with payoff in g. Since a 1 ≤ R 1 − 2ε, Lemma 5.3 implies that π 0, y (0) (τ k , τ k+1 ); T τ k ,τ k+1 ≥ ε 6 µ 1 T (J ) (τ k , τ k+1 )
We apply Lemma 7.1, with 2ε, {τ k } and {(x (0) (τ k , τ k+1 ), y (0) (τ k , τ k+1 ))}. Condition D1 holds by the choice of (x (0) (τ k , τ k+1 ), y (0) (τ k , τ k+1 )) and by Corollary 6.6. Conditions D2 and D3 hold as in the previous case. We now prove that condition D5 holds. By (18) and Corollary 6.6.2,
Since R 1 {1},n = R 1 i.o. and since J j =1 k≥0 λ j (T τ k ,τ k+1 ) ≤ ε on B r,3;g , it follows that condition D5 holds.
Condition D6 follows by an analog argument. Condition D4 follows from conditions D5 and D6, and since a 1 ≤ R 1 − 2ε or a 2 ≤ R 2 − 2ε.
8. Proof of Proposition 5.5. This section is devoted to the proof of Proposition 5.5. We start by defining some new concepts for games on finite trees and by studying some of their properties. The proof itself appears in Section 8.5.
Throughout the section we fix a stopping game on a tree that satisfies conditions B1-B4. 8.1. Union of strategies. Given n stationary strategies x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n , we define their union x by x(s) = 1 − 1≤k≤n (1 − x k (s)). The probability that the union strategy continues at each node is the probability that all of its components continue. We denote x = x 1+ x 2+ · · ·+ x n . Given n pairs of stationary strategies α k = (x k , y k ), 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we denote by α 1+ · · ·+ α n the stationary strategy pair (x, y) that is defined by x = x 1+ · · ·+ x n and y = y 1+ · · ·+ y n .
Consider n copies of the game that are played simultaneously, such that the choice of a new node is the same across the copies; that is, all copies that have not terminated at stage t are at the same node. Nevertheless, the lotteries made by the players concerning the decision whether to stop are independent. Let α k = (x k , y k ), 1 ≤ k ≤ n, be the stationary strategy pair used in copy k and let α = α 1+ · · ·+ α n .
We consider the first round of the game. Let t k be the stopping stage in copy k, let s k be the node in which termination occurred, let Q k be the set of players that stop at stage t k and let r i k = R i Q k ,s k 1 {t k <∞} be the payoff in the first round. Set π k = π(x k , y k ) = P(t k < ∞) and ρ i k = ρ i (x k , y k ) = E[r i k ].
Let t, r, ρ and π be the analog quantities w.r.t. α: Denoting k * the index of a copy that stops first (so that t k * = min k=1,...,n t k ), we have t = t k * , s = s k * , Q = k:t k =t k * Q k and r i = R i Q,s 1 t<+∞ . Moreover, ρ i = ρ i (x, y) = E[r i ] and π = π(x, y) = P(t < ∞).
Let γ k = γ (x k , y k ) be the expected payoff under α k = (x k , y k ) and let γ = γ (x, y) be the corresponding quantity under α.
The following lemma follows from the independence of the plays given the branch. Recall that F s is the event that the randomly chosen branch passes through s.
LEMMA 8.1. Let s ∈ S 0 be a node of depth j . Then, for every 1 ≤ k, l ≤ n, l = k, the event {t k ≤ j } and the random variable t k 1 {t k ≤j } are independent of t l given F s . LEMMA 8.2. Let N = n k=1 1 {t k <∞} be the number of copies that terminate in the first round. Then:
The first result follows by taking expectations.
For the second result, note that
Indeed, on {N ≤ 1}, (19) holds with equality and on {N ≥ 2}, the left-hand side is at most −1, whereas the right-hand side is at least +1. The result follows by taking expectations.
Heavy and light nodes.
DEFINITION 8.3. Let σ = (x, y) be a pair of stationary strategies and let δ > 0. A node s ∈ S 0 is δ-heavy with respect to σ if P σ (t < ∞|F s ) ≥ δ; that is, the probability of termination in the first round given that the chosen branch passes through s is at least δ. The node s is δ-light w.r.t. σ if P σ (t < ∞|F s ) < δ.
For a fixed δ, we denote by H δ (σ ) the set of δ-heavy nodes w.r.t. σ . Two simple implications of this definition follow:
The following lemma asserts that for every ε-equilibrium (x, y) with high payoffs, H ε (x, y) is nonempty, regardless of the size of the tree.
LEMMA 8.4. Let ε ∈ (0, 1/(36K) 2 ) and let (x, y) be a stationary ε-equilibrium such that R i − ε ≤ γ i (x, y), i = 1, 2. Then H ε (x, y) = φ. In particular, by Fact 2, H ε 2 (x, y) = φ.
COMMENT. The proof hinges on the assumption that R 2 {1},s < R 2 whenever R 1 {1},s = R 1 . As a counterexample when this condition does not hold, take a game in which (a) R i Q,s = 1 for every i, Q and s, and (b) R 1 = R 2 = 1. Then any stationary strategy pair which stops with positive probability is a 0-equilibrium. PROOF OF LEMMA 8.4. We prove that there is a node s such that x s y s > ε, so that s ∈ H ε (x, y) . The idea is that if H ε (x, y) is empty, then the probability that both players stop simultaneously under (x, y) is small, but if (x, y) is an ε-equilibrium, this probability must be high.
Denote π 1 = P x,y (t < ∞, Q = {1}), π 2 = P x,y (t < ∞, Q = {2}) and π 1,2 = P x,y (t < ∞, Q = {1, 2}). These are the probabilities that in a single round, player 1 stops alone, player 2 stops alone and both players stop simultaneously, respectively.
Since for some player i, R i is strictly positive, and hence strictly larger than ε, we have γ i (x, y) ≥ R i −ε > 0. Therefore, π 1 +π 2 +π 1,2 > 0. Assume w.l.o.g. that π 1 ≥ π 2 .
Suppose to the contrary that x s y s ≤ ε for every node s ∈ S 0 . The probability that both players stop simultaneously at s, conditional on the game terminating at s, is 
This implies that π 1,2 ≤ √ ε. Since (x, y) is an ε-equilibrium and since payoffs are bounded by 1,
{1,2},s π 1 + π 2 + π 1,2 ≤ π 1 (R 2 − 1/K) + π 2 R 2 + π 1,2 π 1 + π 2 + π 1,2 .
Since π 1 ≥ π 2 and ε < 1/4K, this implies that π 1,2 ≥ 1/6K. In particular, √ ε ≥ π 1,2 ≥ 1/6K, which is a contradiction when ε < 1/36K 2 .
8.3. Orthogonal strategies.
DEFINITION 8.5. Let δ > 0. A sequence (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ) of stationary strategy pairs is δ-orthogonal if α k+1 (s) = (0, 0) for every 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and every node s ∈ H δ (α 1+ · · ·+ α k ); that is, α k+1 continues on δ-heavy nodes of α 1+ · · ·+ α k . LEMMA 8.6. Let δ > 0, let (α 1 , . . . , α n ) be a δ-orthogonal sequence of stationary strategy pairs, let k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and let s ∈ S be a node of depth j . Then
PROOF. Fix k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We prove the lemma by induction on the nodes of T , starting from the leaves and climbing up to the root.
Let s ∈ S 1 be a leaf of T . Since s is a leaf, P(j ≤ t k < ∞) = 0 and (20) is trivially satisfied.
Assume now that s ∈ S 0 . Then
By the induction hypothesis, for every child s ∈ C s ,
By Lemma 8.1, {t k = j } and l<k {t l < ∞} are independent given F s . Therefore
If s is δ-light w.r.t. α 1+ · · ·+ α k−1 , then P( l<k {t l < ∞}|F s ) < δ. If s is δ-heavy, then, according to the definition of orthogonality, P(t k = j |F s ) = 0. Therefore,
Equations (21)
Applying Lemma 8.6 to the root we get: Let δ > 0 and let (α 1 , . . . , α n ) be a δ-orthogonal sequence of stationary strategy pairs. For every k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
LEMMA 8.8. Let δ > 0, let (α 1 , . . . , α n ) be a δ-orthogonal sequence of stationary strategy pairs and let N = n k=1 1 {t k <∞} . Then E[(N + 1)1 {N≥2} ] ≤ 3δ(π 1 + π 2 + · · · + π n ).
The result follows by Corollary 8.7.
From Lemmas 8.2 and 8.8 we get the following: COROLLARY 8.9. Let δ > 0 and let (α 1 , . . . , α n ) be a δ-orthogonal sequence of strategy pairs. Denote α = α 1+ · · ·+ α n . Then for i = 1, 2: 1. We have (1 − 3δ) n k=1 π k ≤ π ≤ n k=1 π k . 2. We have n k=1 ρ i k − 3δ n k=1 π k ≤ ρ i ≤ n k=1 ρ i k + 3δ n k=1 π k .
LEMMA 8.10. Let δ > 0 and let (α 1 , . . . , α n ) be a δ-orthogonal sequence of stationary strategy pairs. Denote α = α 1+ · · ·+ α n . Then for i = 1, 2,
PROOF. By Corollary 8.9 and (6),
In both cases, the right-hand side is bounded by γ i × n k=1 π k + 3δ n k=1 π k , so that
The proof of the right-hand inequality is similar.
From Lemma 8.10 and (6) we get:
COROLLARY 8.11. Let δ > 0 and let (α 1 , . . . , α n ) be a δ-orthogonal sequence of stationary strategy pairs. Denote α = α 1+ · · ·+ α n . Let −1 ≤ u, v ≤ 1.
8.4. Strong orthogonality. In the present section we define a stronger notion of orthogonality and study its properties. DEFINITION 8.12. Let δ > 0. A sequence (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ) of stationary strategy pairs is δ-strongly orthogonal if, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and every node s ∈ H δ (α 1+ · · ·+ α k ), α k+1 (s ) = (0, 0) for s = s and for every descendent s of s; that is, α k+1 continues from s onward.
The following lemma provides a way to construct ε-orthogonal sequences of strategy pairs from a single ε 2 -strongly orthogonal sequence.
LEMMA 8.13. Let ε > 0 and let y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n be stationary strategies of player 2 such that the sequence ((0, y 1 ), . . . , (0, y n )) is ε 2 -strongly orthogonal. Letx be any pure stationary strategy of player 1 that does not stop twice on the same branch; that is, ifx(s) = 1, thenx(s ) = 0 for every descendant s of s. Define strategies (x k ) n k=1 of player 1 in the following way: For each s ∈ S such thatx(s) = 1, letx k (s) = 1, where k ≤ n is the greatest index for which s / ∈ H ε ((0, y 1 )+ · · ·+ (0, y k−1 )). Definex k (s) = 0 otherwise. Letᾱ k = (x k , y k ). Then the sequence (ᾱ 1 , . . . ,ᾱ n ) is ε-orthogonal.
PROOF. By the definition of (x k ) 1≤k≤n and Fact 1, we get, for every l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}:
Ifx l (s) = 1 thens ∈ H ε (0, y 1 )+ · · ·+ (0, y l ) ; (24) Ifx l+1 (s) = 1 thens / ∈ H ε (0, y 1 )+ · · ·+ (0, y l ) .
Let l ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and let s ∈ S be ε-heavy with respect toσ l =ᾱ 1+ · · ·+ᾱ l . We prove thatx l+1 (s) = y l+1 (s) = 0.
We first prove thatx l+1 (s) = 0. Since s is ε-heavy w.r.t.σ l =ᾱ 1+ · · ·+ᾱ l , Pσ l (t < ∞|F s ) ≥ ε. Assume to the contrary thatx l+1 (s) = 1. By (24), s is ε-light w.r.t. (0, y 1 )+ · · ·+ (0, y l ) and, therefore, P (0,y 1 )+ ···+ (0,y l ) (t < ∞|F s ) < ε. It follows that P (x 1 ,0)+ ···+ (x l ,0) (t < ∞|F s ) > 0, a contradiction to the assumption thatx does not stop twice on the same branch.
We proceed to prove that y l+1 (s) = 0. Assume first that there exists an ancestor s of s such thatx 1 (s ) + · · · +x l (s ) = 1. By (24) and Fact 1, s ∈ H ε ((0, y 1 )+ · · ·+ (0, y l )). Since ((0, y 1 ), . . . , (0, y n ) ) is ε-strongly orthogonal, y l+1 (s) = 0.
We assume now thatx 1 (s ) + · · · +x l (s ) = 0 for every ancestor s of s. LetD be the (possibly empty) set of s's descendants d that are ε-heavy w.r.t. (0, y 1 )+ · · ·+ (0, y l ) and let D be the set that is obtained by removing fromD all nodes that have strict ancestors inD. By the definition of D, P (0,y 1 )+ ···+ (0,y l ) (t < ∞|F d ) ≥ ε for every d ∈ D. Let Y = d∈D F d . Since this is a mutually disjoint union, it follows that if Y = φ, then P (0,y 1 )+ ···+ (0,y l ) (t < ∞|Y ) ≥ ε ≥ ε × Pσ l (t < ∞|Y ).
By (24) and the definition of (x k ) 1≤k≤n , it follows that
Combining the last two inequalities and observing that Y ⊆ F s , we get P (0,y 1 )+ ···+ (0,y l ) (t < ∞|F s ) ≥ ε × Pσ l (t < ∞|F s ) ≥ ε 2 .
Thus s is ε 2 -heavy with respect to (0, y 1 )+ · · ·+ (0, y l ) and, as the sequence ((0, y 1 ), . . . , (0, y n )) is ε 2 -orthogonal, y l+1 (s) = 0. LEMMA 8.14. Let ε ∈ (0, 1 6 ) and let a 1 , a 2 ∈ [−1, 1]. Let (α 1 , . . . , α n ) be an ε 2 -strongly orthogonal sequence of stationary strategy pairs such that α k is an ε-equilibrium for each k = 1, . . . , n. Assume that for each k, γ k ∈ [a 1 , a 1 + ε] × [a 2 , a 2 +ε], where γ k is the payoff that corresponds to α k . Let α = α 1+ · · ·+ α n = (x, y). Then:
(a) We have a i − ε ≤ γ i (x, y). (b) For each pair (x , y ) of stationary strategies, γ 1 (x , y) ≤ a 1 + 8ε and γ 2 (x, y ) ≤ a 2 + 8ε.
PROOF. Denote α k = (x k , y k ). We prove the result only for player 1. We first prove (a). Since a 1 ≤ γ 1 k (x k , y k ) for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n, it follows from Corollary 8.11 and since ε < 1/6, that a 1 − ε ≤ a 1 − 6ε 2 ≤ γ 1 (x, y).
We now prove (b). Letx be a stationary strategy that maximizes player 1's payoff against y: γ 1 (x, y) = max x γ 1 (x , y). Fixing y, the game reduces to a Markov decision process and hence such anx exists. Moreover, there exists such a strategyx that is pure [i.e.,x(s) ∈ {0, 1} for every s] and stops at most once in every branch. Observe that since the sequence (α 1 , . . . , α n ) is ε 2 -strongly orthogonal, so is the sequence ((0, y 1 ), . . . , (0, y n )). Letx 1 , . . . ,x k be the strategies defined in Lemma 8.13 w.r.t.x and y 1 , . . . , y n . Thenx =x 1+ · · ·+x n and (ᾱ 1 , . . . ,ᾱ n ) is ε-orthogonal, whereᾱ k = (x k , y k ).
For each k, (x k , y k ) is an ε-equilibrium and, therefore, γ 1 (x k , y k ) ≤ a 1 + 2ε. By Corollary 8.11 and the definition ofx, for every x we have γ 1 (x , y) ≤ γ 1 (x, y) ≤ a 1 + 2ε + 6ε = a 1 + 8ε. 8.5. Proof of Proposition 5.5. We now prove Proposition 5.5. Consider the following recursive procedure: The idea is to keep adding strongly orthogonal ε-equilibria as long as we can. The procedure continues until there is no ε-equilibrium in any subgame ofT with payoffs in [a 1 , a 1 + ε] × [a 2 , a 2 + ε]. The termination of the procedure follows from Lemma 8.4.
The first part of Proposition 5.5 is an immediate consequence of the termination of the procedure. We now prove that σ n = (x, y) satisfies the requirements of the second part. Since D = H n is the set of ε 2 -heavy nodes of (x, y), π(x, y) ≥ ε 2 × p D . For every 1 ≤ k ≤ n, γ i (x k , y k ) ≥ R i − ε, so that (x k , y k ) is an ε-equilibrium in T . Thus ((x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x n , y n )) is an ε 2 -strongly orthogonal sequence of stationary ε-equilibria. The remaining claims of Proposition 5.5 follow from Lemma 8.14. 9. More than two players. When there are more than two players, it is no longer true that games on a tree admit stationary ε-equilibria. An example of a three-player game where this phenomenon happens was first found by Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze (1997) . Nevertheless, a consequence of Solan (1999) is that every three-player game on a tree admits a periodic ε-equilibrium, but the period may be long [see Solan (2001) ]. We do not know whether this result can be used to generalize Proposition 5.5 for three-player games.
When there are at least four players, the existence of ε-equilibria in stopping games on finite trees is still an open problem, even in the deterministic case; that is, when every node in the tree has at most a single child. For more details, the reader is referred to Solan and Vieille (2001) .
